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Abstract 
Birren and Bengtson’s (1988, p. ix) assessment of the field of aging research that it is 
"data rich and theory poor" still holds today and applies to developmental science as a 
whole. The accumulation of descriptive results that are not integrated into overarching 
theories of development lead to less progress in gaining knowledge about developmental 
processes than one might wish for, particularly considering its importance for enhancing 
development across the life span. My wish is that we as developmental researchers 
become more theory-driven and creative in our empirical approaches to study 
development. Complementing age-correlative studies, I propose that we make more use 
of experimental approaches that target the causal mechanisms driving developmental 
changes (or stability) more directly than by comparing different age groups.  
 Keywords: Experiments, Brunswikian approach, theory-driven. 
  
Experiments targeting developmental processes- 3	  
If I had one wish… I would want the study of human development make faster 
progress in understanding developmental processes rather than being concerned primarily 
with age-related differences. In my view, this would require a theory-driven and 
empirically vigorous approach. 
Yes, but this is what developmental science is all about, you might say. We all 
want this. And probably we all do – if we discount the more petty side of all of academia 
that is about pushing individual careers and success by increasing the length of one’s 
publication list rather than actually contributing to accumulating knowledge. Since the 
attribute “incremental” has become a killer description most certainly preventing a paper 
to be published, it seems researchers have to come up with a new theory or model 
(preferably labeled with a catchy acronym) or a description of a – however marginal – 
phenomenon that is “sexy” and might be more geared towards recounting it at parties 
rather than to make a lasting (if small) contribution to our area.   
But most research is incremental, it should build on previous work and constitute 
one step in an upward trend towards more knowledge. I believe that this trend pushing 
researchers to proclaim their theory or model (instead of working on one that is already 
out there) and to publish “sexy” research is detrimental to our field as it prevents the 
more incremental approach, the search for the most appropriate theory and refining it 
(rather than everybody pushing their own theory), and the building of a cumulative and 
solid knowledge base that helps understanding human development. In child 
development, the descriptive approach is often still very prominent. Not that description 
in and of itself is not informative and necessary as a factual basis on which to build 
theories. However, as a purely descriptive fact, what does it really tell us if an infant can 
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do something at 7 or at 11 months of age if this is not embedded in a theoretical 
framework that would predict one or the other?  In adult development and aging, the field 
suffers more from a predominance of cross-sectional, correlative age comparisons 
between young and older adults (even though they are often done with extremely 
sophisticated statistical analyses). Descriptions and correlations are both very limited in 
contributing in a stringent way to theories about developmental processes. 
 What may be the remedy? I am not sure how to counteract the pressure to publish 
more and more (with the consequence to also publish papers that would greatly profit if 
more work went into them), the push to produce exciting (in the sense of counter-
intuitive) results, and the frowning upon incremental research building on somebody 
else’s theory. Changes in this regard would involve a lot of politics at research 
institutions, universities, and funding agencies. I do believe, however, that we can be 
more theoretically and empirically vigorous. 
 Go experimental in developmental research.  The problems associated with 
correlational work in general and with age-correlative, cross-sectional designs in 
particular, are well documented (e.g., Baltes, Reese, & Nesselroade, 1977) and need no 
additional summary here. In the current context, I would like to mention only the problem 
of inferring causality and of identifying psychological processes resulting in an 
association between different variables, including age-related differences in such 
associations. Mediation analyses are generally not well suited to test psychological 
processes (see Fiedler, Meiser, & Schott, 2011) and extracting age variance in cross-
sectional designs in an attempt to test developmental processes is even less appropriate 
(Hofer & Sliwinski, 2001; Lindenberger, Oertzen, Ghisletta, & Hertzog, 2011). Given 
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these difficulties in investigating causal mechanisms driving age-related changes and 
provide insights into developmental processes, how can the field move beyond the 
description of age-related differences or age-differential covariations of different 
variables? 
In a recent paper with Derek Isaacowitz (Freund & Isaacowitz, 2014), we 
proposed that the field of adult development and aging would profit by using more 
experimental designs targeting the processes driving age-related differences. There are 
numerous experiments in this field, but they still mostly use a correlative design 
regarding age instead of aiming at manipulating the processes that are believed to cause 
age-related differences. Age itself does not represent a psychological mechanism causing 
changes in cognition, behavior, emotion, or motivation. Instead, age is a carrier variable 
for psychological processes associated with chronological age that may cause age-related 
differences (e.g., Wohlwill, 1970). One of the consequences, then, is experimental 
manipulation needs to target the psychological processes theorized to underlie age-related 
differences. This requires a well-formulated theory that identifies which age-related 
processes bring about which age-related differences. 
For instance, assume you are interested in age-related differences in speed vs. 
power cognitive tasks. You might give children, young and old adults the same task 
either speeded or with a power instruction, and then compare the differences across age 
groups. Regarding age, this still constitutes a correlative design and, as such, is 
descriptive. Targeting potential processes causing differences between age groups could 
involve, for instance, experimentally manipulating sensory acuity. This could be done by 
giving younger adults partially occluded glasses or headphones that filter out certain 
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frequencies. Such a procedure could simulate sensory functioning in old age (for such an 
approach attempting to tackle mechanisms driving age-related differences in cognitive 
functioning see Lindenberger, Scherer, & Baltes, 2001).  Another approach could be to 
use training studies to simulate larger amounts of experience with a certain task or topic if 
the theory maintains that age-related differences in task performance are due to a lack of 
experience in one of the age groups (see Park & Reuter-Lorenz, 2009, who make use of 
this approach to test the scaffolding theory of aging and cognition, STAC).   
And when you go experimental, do it in a Brunswikian way. One of the main 
challenges to good experimentation concerns the external validity of the experiment, that 
is whether it adequately represents the organism-environment relation (Brunswik, 1952).  
Based on the assumption that psychological processes evolved as adaptions to the natural 
environment, Brunswik (1955) posits that psychological processes can only be adequately 
tested if the experimental stimuli are representative of this natural environment reflecting 
the person’s ecology regarding the frequency, range, value, distribution, and the 
covariation of its features.  
The importance of the person-context transaction for understanding development 
is also recognized in relational developmental system models (Lerner, 2012; Overton, 
2013). Of importance, the transaction between a person and his/her context changes over 
time. This implies that experimental stimuli that might be representative of the natural 
environment of one age group might not be representative of the environment of another 
age group.  Thus, when comparing different age groups, experimenters have to ensure the 
equivalence of stimuli in the ecologies of the different age groups. This clearly requires 
more work than simply assuming that the same stimulus has the same meaning for 
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different age groups, but if this point is neglected, it might lead to erroneous conclusions. 
For instance, when comparing the emotional reactivity between children two and nine 
years of age, school-related stimuli (e.g., bad grades) likely carry more importance for 
school children compared to toddlers.  Concluding from the use of such stimuli that two-
year-olds are not as emotionally reactive as nine-year-olds, however, is not warranted.  
Although I focus on age in this essay, it is important to note that the same argument 
applies equally to other individual difference variables that might influence how people 
interpret experimental stimuli, such as SES, culture, or gender, to name but a few.  
The use of representative designs. How to implement a representative design that 
allows generalizing the results of an experiment to processes occurring in the context in 
which people actually operate on a day-to-day basis? One way of achieving 
representativeness according to Brunswik is to sample stimuli in such a way that they are 
representative of the (group of) persons’ ecology.  Thus, researchers need to first define a 
reference class of relevant stimuli (i.e., the class of objects or events that the phenomenon 
of interest entails) as they occur in the natural environment of the persons under 
investigation, and then draw a random sample from them. Importantly, this sampling 
procedure also involves a representation of the distribution of the stimuli and the co-
occurance of stimuli or different stimulus dimensions.   
Non-representative sampling might cause misleading results. In the area of 
emotion recognition and aging, Isaacowitz and Stanley (2011) argued that the results of 
many studies might lead to erroneous conclusions because tasks fail to include important 
contextual cues for emotion recognition in older adults’ ecologies  (e.g., temporal, 
interpersonal, environmental cues). The processes involved in emotion recognition used 
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in non-representative experimental settings might thus be fundamentally different to the 
ones older adults use in their everyday lives (see also Richter, Dietzel, & Kunzmann, 
2010). 
Over- or under-sampling certain stimuli or stimulus/feature constellations might 
also lead to biased results as the typical adaptations that have evolved in the ecology of 
the person under investigation might not be displayed. For instance, when interested in 
how teachers react to students of differing abilities, confronting them with a virtual class 
room of only high or poorly performing students will not elicit the same set of responses 
from teachers as when confronted with the distribution of students’ performances 
typically encountered in the classrooms of the teachers under investigation. The teachers 
might react very differently to the one poorly performing student in a high performing 
class than to one among many poorly performing students. In the latter case, teachers 
might spend additional time to go over the materials again because they attribute the poor 
performance to their own poor instruction. In the other case, the same teachers might feel 
that the sole poorly performing student should not hold back the rest of the class and ask 
him/her to go over the materials again by him-/herself.   
It would be neither correct to conclude that teachers repeat instructions when 
students perform poorly nor that they rely on the students’ own initiative to catch up.  
Having poorly performing students catch up by themselves might have been a strategy 
the teachers came up on the spot in the experimental situation as they have never 
encountered this stimulus constellation before.  Were they confronted with such a 
situation frequently, they might have developed a very different strategy (e.g., paying 
more attention during instructions to the one poorly performing student). Note, that 
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teachers of different kinds of schools (e.g., primary, middle, or high school; public vs. 
private schools) may encounter different ecologies in their classrooms. Hence, 
representative sampling also involves identifying different ecologies for different 
subsamples. This is also true when comparing different age groups that likely differ in 
their ecologies. 
How to identify reference classes. Hammond (1998) proposes to identify 
reference classes on a theoretical basis and delineate the theoretically relevant structural 
elements of the stimuli. The stimulus materials (and experimental tasks) then have to 
mirror these structural elements: "In short, you have to be specific about the variables that 
a theory tells you are the important ones, namely, the ones that if ignored would produce 
a critically different result than if not ignored." (Hammond, 1998, p. 4).  
Deriving experimental stimuli by probing naturally occurring situations. If no 
such theory exists, researchers can follow Brunswik’s approach to sample stimuli (or 
situations) by randomly probing naturally occurring situations. This can be done with 
experience or time sampling procedures that allow tapping into the everyday lives of 
(groups of) participants in a relatively unobtrusive way. This approach seems very 
promising when dealing with the ecologies of different age groups (e.g., Riediger & 
Freund, 2008). In this way, stimuli that are equivalent across age groups and 
representative of the ecologies of the different age groups can be identified. 
Note, that not only stimuli might take on different meanings depending on the 
different ecologies that people experience in their lives, but the same applies to the 
responses to the stimuli. For instance, sucking intensity might be a good indicator of 
experiencing novelty in babies but is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of this construct in 
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school children. Again, the equivalence of these relations between the distal variables, the 
proximal or cue variables, and the response need to be established across age groups (see 
Freund & Isaacowitz, 2014, for an elaboration of the different kinds of validities in a 
Brunswikian framework and how they relate to developmental research). This is true not 
only for experiments but equally concerns correlative designs that involve self-report or 
behavioral observation. In the area of psychometric research on the development of 
personality and cognition, this is typically addressed by establishing measurement 
equivalence across age groups (e.g., Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2003). In contrast, only 
rarely is the issue of age-differential representativeness and validities made explicit in 
other areas of developmental research.  
Even though arduous, I believe that developmental science needs to go this route 
of ensuring representativeness of stimulus materials and response options for different 
age groups. Otherwise, the omnipresent alternative interpretation of age-related 
differences is that the stimulus materials or response options provided by the 
experimenter takes on a different meaning for different age groups and because of this 
elicits age-differential responses instead of tapping into developmental processes causing 
these age-differences. Instead, researchers simply assume that holding the stimulus 
materials constant across different groups ensures comparability (in fact, most students 
might learn that this is one of the hallmarks of good experimentation). To avoid 
misunderstandings, the different meanings of the same stimuli in different age groups can 
also represent an interesting research topic, but typically it does not constitute the 
research question and is mostly just ignored.  
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Groups or individual persons? In this essay, I wrote mostly about age groups 
neglecting the interindividual variability in intraindividual change (or stability) over time. 
Although space restrictions do not allow elaborating on this very important and 
interesting issue, I would like to mention it at least in passing before concluding this 
essay. Group comparisons, be they between age groups or between experimental groups, 
can only give us very rough approximations of intraindividual processes and even might 
be misleading. It is easy to construct cases in which no individual shows the mean 
trajectory of their group. Therefore, approaches that fit models of change (or stability) to 
each individual person and, in a second step, group individuals based on the similarity of 
their trajectories will allow us to understand intraindividual developmental processes that 
might be camouflaged when only considering mean differences between (age or 
experimental) groups.  
Conclusion. Taken together, I dream of a developmental science that is rooted 
strongly in precisely formulated theories that can be empirically tested and falsified. I 
wish this was done by rigorous empirical testing that makes use of experimental designs 
targeting—as directly as possible—the hypothesized developmental processes. To 
address the particular challenges of involving different age groups, a Brunswikian 
approach to experimentation implementing representative designs ensuring comparable 
validities across age groups seems like a dream come true.  
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